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COMMANDERY OF TBE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 



WAR PAPER 58. 




;iie galtle of gull gur,, ^uly 21, 1861 



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Milifar^ ©rder of {\}q bo^al be^ion 



Onifed States. 



CQMMAWDERY of the DI^TI^ICT of dOLUI^BIA. 



WAR PAPERS. 

68 

The Ballk of B'all '^\xn, i]u.ly 21, 166-1. 

PREPARED BY COMPANION 

Irigadier-General ^,y ^ 

THOMAS M.VINCENT, 

U. S. Army, 

AND 

READ AT THE STATED MEETING OF MARCH 1, 1905. 






M^^ 



®he §iittlr of ^ttll fun, fulj 21, 1861. 



Commander and Companions: 

There .was turmoil in the political atmosphere, and, April, 
i860, the National Democratic Convention assembled at 
Charleston, S. C Dissensions were apparent as to congres- 
sional protection of slavery in the territories. The Southern 
delegates withdrew, organized a separate convention and then 
adjourned, May 4, to meet at Richmond, Virginia, June 1 1 . 
The Northern wing adjourned to meet at Baltimore, Maryland, 
June 18. In May the Constitutional Union Party in Conven- 
tion at Baltimore, adopted a platform evading the slavery 
issue; and, the same month, the National Republican Party, 
in Convention at Chicago, nominated Abraham Lincoln for 
President, and pronounced favorably as to congressional 
prohibition of slavery in the territories. In June the National 
Democratic Convention, at Baltimore, declared in favor of 
leaving the question of slavery to the people of the territories, 
or to the United States Supreme Court ; and the same month 
the Southern Democratic National Convention declared that 
neither Congress, nor a territorial legislature, had the right 
to prohibit slavery in a territory, and that it was the duty of 
the Federal Government, in all its departments, to protect 
slavery in the territories when necessary. 

The Congress of the United States met December 3, and 
President Buchanan submitted his message, wherein he argued 
adversely as to the right of secession, but expressed doubt 
as to the constitutional power of the Congress to make war 
upon a State. December 6, a select committee of 33 was 
appointed by the House of Representatives, to take measures 



for the perpetuity of the Union; and, February 28, 1861, 
that body adopted the amendment offered by the committee 
of 33, prohibiting any interference by Congress with slavery 
in the States. The amendment was adopted by the Senate 
March 2, but failed to be adopted by the necessary number 
of States. 

All events had tended, and now moved rapidly, to the 
"years of warfare and turbulence which ensued." Among 
them, December 20, the secession of South Carolina ; December 
26, the transfer of United States troops from Fort Moultrie 
to Fort Sumter; December 27, the seizure of Castle Pinckney 
and Fort Moultrie by the South Carohna authorities; Decem- 
ber 30, the seizure of the United States Arsenal at Charleston ; 
January 11, 1861, the surrender of Fort Sumter was demanded ; 
and March 1 1 marked the adoption of the Constitution of 
the Confederate States of America. Thereafter States seceded 
rapidly; United States forts and other property were seized; 
a relief-ship destined for Fort Sumter was fired upon, and 
driven back at the entrance of Charleston Harbor; an act was 
passed by the Confederate Congress to provide munitions of 
war, and, March 6, 1861, another act to establish an army, 
not to exceed 100,000 men, for 12 months' service. April 
13, Sumter surrendered, and on the 14th was occupied by 
Confederate troops. All the foregoing had resulted prior to 
April 15, when President Lincoln called for 75,000 militia 
for 3 months' service, and summoned Congress to convene 
July 4th. 

Between April 17, when Virginia seceded, and July 21, 
Harper's Ferry was abandoned and burned; the United States 
troops had conflict with the Baltimore mob; military com- 
mands — Union and Confederate — were formed; calls made for 
troops; and skirmishes with other minor conflicts connected 
with operations, took place in Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia 
and West Virginia. 



May 6, the Confederate Congress recognized the existence 
of a state of war between the United States and the Confede- 
rate States, and, May 7 Arhngton Heights were occupied by 
Virginia troops — Major-General Robert E- Lee, having been, 
April 23, assigned to command the forces in Virginia — and 
that State was admitted into the Confederate States of America. 
May 15 Brigadier-General Joseph E- Johnston, C S. A. was 
assigned to command at Harper's Ferry — there to oppose Gen- 
eral Robert Patterson — and May 24 Brigadier-General M. L- 
Bonham, C. S. A., was assigned to command on the Alexandria 
Line, Virginia. May 24, the Federal troops crossed the Poto- 
mac into Virginia, and occupied Arlington Heights and Alex- 
andria. May 28, Brigadier-General Irvin McDowell, U. S- A., 
assumed command of the Department of Northeast Virginia ; 
and then, June i, followed the skirmishes at Arlington Mills, 
and June 17, Fairfax Court House, and an action at Vienna. 
June 2 General Beauregard superseded Bonham in command 
of the Alexandria Line, and assumed command of all the 
Confederate forces in Prince William, Fairfax, and Loudoun 
Counties. July 16 the Federal Army advanced towards 
Manassas, and July 17 the Confederate Army retired to the 
line of Bull Run, which resulted as the battle-line for the first 
momentous contest of the Civil War. 

Beauregard has said ;**:!;" Previously — indeed as 
early as the middle of June — it had become apparent to my 
mind that through only one course of action could there be 
a well grounded hope of ability, on the part of the Confede- 
rates to encounter successfully the offensive operations for 
which the Federal authorities were then rigorously preparing 
in my immediate front with so consummate a strategist and 
military administrator as Lieutenant-General Scott in general 
command at \\'ashington, aided by his accomplished heads 
of the large General Staff Corps of the United States Army. 
This course was to make the most enterprising, warlike use of 



the interior lines which we possessed, for the swift concentra- 
tion at the critical instant of every available Confederate 
force upon the menaced position, at the risk, if need were, 
of sacrificing all minor places to the one clearly of major 
military value — there to meet our adversary so offensively 
as to overwhelm him under circumstances that must require 
immediate ability to assume the general offensive, even upon 
his territory; and thus conquer an early peace by a few well- 
delivered blows. 

" My views of such import had been already earnestly com- 
municated to the proper authorities; but about the middle 
of July, satisfied that McDowell was on the eve of taking the 
offensive against me, I dispatched [to President Davis], an 
aide-de-camp to urge, in substance, the necessity for the 
immediate concentration of the larger part of the forces of 
Johnston and Holmes at Manassas, so that the moment 
McDowell should be sufficiently far detached from Washington, 
I would be enabled to move rapidly round his more convenient 
flank upon his rear and communications, and attack him in 
reverse, or get between his forces, then separated, thus cutting 
off his retreat upon Arlington in the event of his defeat, and 
insuring as an immediate consequence the crushing of Patterson, 
the liberation of Maryland, and the capture of Washington." 

At this juncture, when the state was in combat with its 
own children, Abraham lyincoln and Jefferson Davis were 
the Commanders-in-Chief of the Federal and Confederate 
Armies, respectively. Both had served in the Black Hawk 
War. Therein Lincoln gained practical military experience, 
(i) as captain of a company; (2) as private in Captain Elijah 
He's independent rangers, formed of "generals, colonels, 
captains, and other distinguished men from the first disbanded 
army"; and (3) again as private in an independent company 
under Captain Jacob M. Early. General Robert Anderson, 
of Fort Sumter fame, mustered him into the two independent 



companies. With the Black Hawk service as a basis, Lincoln's 
subsequent study — particularly from 1861 to 1865 — developed 
him "into a great military man that is to say a man of supreme 
mihtary judgment." We have the evidence of this in the 
pointed questions and memoranda which he placed before 
his generals. 

Davis was a West Point graduate; had commanded a volun- 
teer regiment in the Mexican War — severely wounded in a 
battle of that War — had been United States Secretary of War, 
Representative and Senator — Chairman of the Senate Military 
Committee; and President of a Commission created by act of 
Congress, to examine into the organization system of disci- 
pline, and course of instruction at the United States Military 
Academy. Thus he was fitted to be President of the Confede- 
rate States, with their respective state governments transferred 
thereto "including militia and volunteer organizations in 
complete working order." 

"Lincoln had to adapt the machinery of a conservative 
old government, some of it unsuitable, some unsound, to 
sudden demands for which it was not designed"; as a result 
valuable time was consumed. * * * "Nothing but time 
and experience — possibly nothing but disaster — could remove 
from the path of the Union President difficulties from which 
the Confederate President was, by his situation, entirely free. 
In the beginning of the war, the military advantage was on 
the side of the Confederates, notwithstanding the greater 
resources of the North, which produced their effect only as 
the contest was prolonged." * * * gy|- Lincoln, as he 
studied the situation, grew in firmness and hope — "with 
firmness in the right as God gave him to see the right," and 
we have his majestic enunciations when he said to Charles 
Francis Adams, at London : 

"You will make no admission of weakness in our Constitu- 
tion, or any apprehension on the part of our government. 



* * * You will in no case listen to any suggestion of 
compromise by this Government, under foreign auspices, 
with its discontented citizens." * * * 

And to Minister Dayton at Paris: 

"The President neither expects nor desires any intervention, 
nor even any favor, from the Government of France, or any 
other, in the emergency. If several European States should 
combine in that intervention, the President and the people 
of the United States deem the Union, which would then be 
at stake, worth all the cost and all the sacrifices of a contest 
with all the world at arms, if such a contest should prove 
inevitable." 

In May the Confederate Government had been transferred 
from Montgomery to Richmond, "and the Capitals of the 
Union and of the Confederacy stood defiantly confronting 
each other." McDowell was south of the Potomac facing the 
opposing forces under Beauregard, whose pickets had been 
forced from their sight of the Capitol. General Johnston's 
forces, at Harper's Ferry, were to be kept engaged by Major- 
General Patterson, who commanded near that place. 

General McDowell's Army consisted of five divisions: 
Tyler's ist, of 4 brigades — Keyes', Schenck's, W. T. Sherman's 

and Richardson's. 
Hunter's 2d, of 2 brigades — Andrew Porter's and Burnside's. 
Heintzelman's yi, of 3 brigades — Franklin's, Willcox's and 

Howard's. 
Runyon's ^th, of 9 regiments — not brigaded. 
Dixon S. Miles' ^th, of 2 brigades — Blenker's and Davies'. 

Richardson's 4th brigade of Tyler's ist division, was attached 

to Miles' 5th division during the battle. 

There were 10 batteries of artillery, beside 2 guns attached 
to infantry regiments — 49 guns total — and 7 companies of 
regular cavalry. Of the foregoing forces, 9 of the batteries 
and 8 companies of infantry were regulars, and i small battalion 



was composed of marines. The aggregate force was about 
35,000 men; of that number Runyon's Fourth Division was 
6 or 7 miles in rear, guarding the Alexandria road, and, though 
counted in the aggregate, was not embraced in McDowell's 
order for battle. 

Beauregard's Army had the brigades of Holmes, Bonham, 
Kwell, D. R. Jones, Longstreet, Cocke, and Early; also 3 
regiments of infantry and 3 battalions of cavalry and 6 batteries 
— 27 guns — of artillery; an available aggregate force, on the 
Bull Run, of about 23,000. Johnston's Shenandoah Army 
had the brigades of Jackson (Stonewall), Bee, Bartow and 
Kirby Smith, 2 regiments of infantry, not brigaded, i regi- 
ment of cavalry and 5 batteries (20 guns), an aggregate of 
8,340. The opposing forces, in the aggregate and parts en- 
gaged, were more nearly equal than in any other Virginia 
battle. 

Unbounded northern enthusiasm said: "On to Richmond." 
It required, as we all know, four years to get there ! 

McDowell's army marched July 16, and the morning of the 
1 8th found it concentrated at Centreville, about 20 miles 
from the Potomac, and 7 east of Manassas Junction. Beaure- 
gard's outposts with slight resistance, fell back to Bull Run. 
That stream, halfway between Centreville and Manassas 
Junction, flows southeasterly. It was a formidable line with 
abrupt banks, timber-fringed and with artificial defenses at 
the fords. The Warrenton Pike, through Centreville, leads 
nearly due west, crossing the stream at the Stone Bridge. 
The Centreville direct road to Manassas crosses at Mitchell's 
ford, about half a mile above Blackburn's ford. All the fords, 
from Union Mills on the south to the Stone Bridge on the 
north, were defended by Beauregard's forces, distributed by 
brigades, as follows: Union Mills — Ewell's and Holmes' 
(the Confederate right) ; McLean's — D. R. Jones' ; Black- 
burn's, — Longstreet's and Karly's; Mitchell's — Bonham (with 



lO 

an outpost east of Bull Run) ; and between Mitchell's and 
Stone Bridge (the Confederate left), was placed Evans, with 
one regiment; Wheat's special battalion of infantry; i battery 
of 4 guns; and 2 companies of cavalry. 

McDowell was forced to await at Centreville until the 
arrival of his provision train brought rations, and the delay 
enabled him to make a reconnoissance to the extreme left of 
his line, with the result that the country was not found suitable 
to a sudden movement of the army to turn the enemy's right 
flank. While he was so engaged, Tyler, July 18, made an 
unauthorized reconnoissance to Mitchell's and Blackburn's 
fords, and there engaged the Confederates. This affair was 
regarded by the Confederates as a serious attack, and dignified 
by them as the "battle of Bull Run," the engagement of the 
2ist being called by them the battle of Manassas. The 
casualties were: Federals, i officer and 18 enlisted killed; 
I officer and 37 enlisted wounded; 36 enlisted missing. Con- 
federates, 15 killed, and 53 wounded, of whom, several died. 
The Confederates were elated over the result — they thought 
they had repulsed a heavy attack. The Federals were corres- 
pondingly depressed. During the 19th and 20th Beauregard 
failed to profit by the advantage he had gained. The opera- 
tions of the 1 8th confirmed McDowell in the belief that with 
his raw troops the Confederate position should be turned, 
instead of a front attack. During the 19th and 20th he studied 
the Confederate position and planned to manoeuvre the enemy 
out of it. Beauregard did not use aggressive movements 
until the 21st, and then through lack of comprehension on 
part of his subordinates, "the effort was a complete fiasco, 
with the comical result of frightening his own troops, who, 
late in the afternoon, mistook the return of one of their brigades 
for an attack by McDowell's left, and the serious result of 
interfering with the pursuit after he had gained the battle 
of the 2ist." 



II 

McDowell undertook his campaign with the understanding 
that Johnston should be prevented from joining Beauregard. 
Yet Johnston's army, 9,000 strong, did join — Bee's brigade 
and Johnston, in person, arriving the morning of the 20th, 
the remainder about noon of the 21st. McDowell's enforced 
delay at Centreville enabled him to provision his troops and 
gain information necessary to base an excellent plan of attack ; 
but it proved fatal by affording time for a junction of the 
opposing forces. McDowell's plan of battle promulgated on 
the 20th, was to turn the enemy's left, force him from his 
defensive position, and, "if possible, destroy the railroad 
leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, where the 
enemy has a large force." When the promulgation was made 
McDowell suspected, but did not know, that Johnston had 
joined Beauregard ! 

According to the plan of battle, Miles' Fifth Division was 
to remain at Centreville — Richardson's brigade of Tyler's 
division to form part of it; also a strong artillery force. This 
combined force was to be the reserve, and was to prepare defen- 
sive works at Centreville and threaten Blackburn's ford. 
Tyler's First Division was to move at 2.30 A. M., threaten the 
Stone Bridge, and open fire upon it at daybreak. The demon- 
stration was to be vigorous; its first purpose being to divert 
attention from the movements of the turning column. As 
soon as Tvler's troops had cleared the way. Hunter's Second 
Division, followed by Heintzelman's Third Division was to 
move to a point on the Warrenton Pike, i or 2 miles east of 
Centreville, there turn to the right by a country-road, cross 
the Run at Sudley Springs, come down upon the flank and 
rear of the enemy at the Stone Bridge, and force him to open 
the way for Tyler's Division to cross there and attack fresh 
and in full force. Tyler's start was so late, and his advance 
so slow, as to hold Hunter and Heintzelman 2 or 3 hours 
on the mile or two of the turnpike between their camps and 



12 

the point where they were to turn off for the flank march. 
This delay, and the fact that the flank march proved difficult, 
and some 12 miles instead of 6 as was expected, were of serious 
moment. The flanking column did not arrive at Sudley's 
Springs until 9.30 instead of 7. The long interrupted march 
tired out the troops, and the delay gave the enemy time to 
discover the turning movement. Tyler's operations against 
the Stone Bridge were feeble and ineffective. By 8 o'clock 
Evans — on the Confederate left — felt that he was in no danger 
in front, and perceived the movement to turn his position — 
the left of the Confederate line — guarding the point where 
the Warrenton turnpike the great highway to the battle- 
field, crossed Bull Run, the Confederate line of defense. He 
did not have instructions, in the emergency, to guide him, but 
he did not hesitate. Reporting his information and purpose 
to Cocke, the adjoining commander, and leaving 4 companies 
of infantry to deceive and hold Tyler at the bridge, Evans, 
before 9 o'clock, turned his back upon the point he was set 
to guard, marched a mile away, and seizing the high ground 
to the north of Young's Branch of Bull Run, formed line of 
battle, at right angle to his former line, his left resting on 
the Sudlev Springs road, by which Burnside with the head 
of his turning column was approaching — thus covering the 
Warrenton turnpike and opposing a determined front to the 
Federal advance upon the Confederate left and rear. In his 
rear to the south lay the valley of Young's Branch, and rising 
from that was the higher ridge or plateau, on which the 
Robinson and Henry houses were situated, and on which the 
main action took place in the afternoon. Burnside, finding 
Evans across his path, promptly formed line of battle and 
attacked about 9.45 A. M. Hunter, the division commander, 
who was at the head of Burnside's brigade directing the forma- 
tion of the first skirmish line, was severely wounded and taken 
to the rear. Evans not only repulsed but pursued the attack- 



^3 

ing troops. Andrew Porter's brigade of Hunter's division 
followed Burnside closely, and came to his support. In the 
meantime Bee had formed a Confederate line of battle with 
his and Bartow's brigades of Johnston's army, on the Henry 
house plateau, a stronger position than the one held by Evans, 
and Bee desired Evans to fall back to that line; but Evans — 
probably feeling bound to cover the Warrenton Pike, and 
hold it against Tyler, as well as against the flanking column — 
insisted that Bee should move across the valley to his support, 
which was done. , 

After Bee joined Evans the preliminary battle continued 
to rage upon the ground chosen by the latter. The opposing 
forces were Burnside's and Porter's brigades with one regiment 
of Heintzelman's division on the Federal side; and Evans', 
Bee's, and Bartow's brigades on the Confederate side. The 
Confederates were dislodged and driven back to the Henry 
house plateau, where Bee had previously formed line and 
where what Beauregard called, "the mingled remnants of 
Bee's, Bartow's and Evans" commands" were reformed under 
cover of Stonewall Jackson's brigade of Johnston's army. 

The time of this repulse, as proved by Jackson, was before 
11.30 A. M., and this is confirmed by Beauregard's official 
report, made at the time. Sherman and Keyes had not any- 
thing to do with it; they did not begin to cross Bull Run 
until noon. Thus after nearly two hours' stubborn fighting 
with Johnston's forces — which General Scott had promised 
should be kept away — McDowell won the first advantage; 
but Johnston had cost him dearly. 

During all this time Johnston and Beauregard had been 
waiting near Mitchell's Ford, — not remote from Miles' Fifth 
Division, on the Federal left flank — for the development of 
the attack that had been ordered by their right upon McDowell 
at Centreville. The gravity of the situation, upon their left, 
had not dawned upon them. What might the result have 



H 

been if the Federal column had not been detained by Tyler's 
delay in moving out in the early morning, or if Johnston's 
army, to which Bee, Bartow, and Jackson belonged, had not 
arrived? 

The heavy firing on the left soon diverted Johnston and 
Beauregard from their intended offensive movement with 
their right — against Miles on the Federal left — and decided 
them, as Beauregard has said, "to hurry up all available 
reinforcements, including the reserves that were to have moved 
upon Centreville, to our left, and fight the battle out in that 
quarter." Thereupon Beauregard ordered "Ewell, Jones and 
Longstreet to make a strong demonstration all along their 
front on the other [Federal] side of Bull Run, and ordered 
the reserves — Holmes' brigade, with 6 guns and Early's 
brigade — to move swiftly to the left"; and he and Johnston 
set out at full speed for the point of conflict, which they 
reached while Bee was attempting to rally his men, about 
Jackson's brigade on the Henry house plateau. McDowell 
reached the scene of conflict somewhat earlier than Johnston 
and Beauregard, and, seeing the enemy driven across Young's 
Branch Valley and behind the Warrenton turnpike, at once 
ordered Tyler to "press the attack" at the Stone Bridge. 
Tyler received the order by 1 1 o'clock, and it was upon his 
division that McDowell relied for the decisive fighting of the 
day. He knew that the march of the turning column would 
be fatiguing and when by a sturdy fight, it had cleared the 
Warrenton turnpike it had, in fact, done more than its fair 
portion of the work. Tyler knew, from the plan of battle, 
that when Hunter and Heintzelman had attacked the enemy 
in the vicinity of the Stone Bridge, "he was to force the 
passage of Bull Run at that point and attack the enemy in 
flank." Soon after McDowell reached the front, Burnside 
said to him that his brigade was out of ammunition and that 
he wished to withdraw to refit and fill his cartridge-boxes. 



15 

McDowell reluctantly consented and the brigade which had 
done so nobly, took no further part in the fight. After 
ordering Tyler to press his attack and sending orders to the 
rear of the turning column to hurry forward, McDowell, like 
Beauregard, rushed in person into the conflict, and by force 
of circumstance became for the time the commander of the 
turning column and the force actually engaged, rather than 
the commander of the whole army. With the exception of 
sending his adjutant-general to find and hurry Tyler forward, 
his subsequent orders were mainly, or wholly, to the troops 
under his own observation. It was not until 12 o'clock that 
Sherman received orders from Tyler to cross the stream 
which he did at a ford above the Stone Bridge, going to the 
assistance of Hunter. Sherman reported to McDowell on the 
field, and joined in the pursuit of Bee's forces across the 
valley of Young's Branch. Keyes' brigade, accompanied by 
Tyler in person, followed across the stream where Sherman 
forded, but without uniting with the other forces on the 
field, made a feeble advance upon the slope of the plateau 
toward the Robinson house, and then about 2 o'clock filed 
off by flank to its left, and, sheltered by the east front of the 
bluff that forms the plateau, marched down Young's Branch, 
out of sight of the enemy, and took no further part in the 
engagement. McDowell did not know where the brigade 
was, nor did he then know that Schenck's brigade of Tyler's 
division did not cross the Run. McDowell as he passed to 
the front, had given orders for it to remain on the east side 
of the Run to support Carhsle's battery — this about i P. M. 
The brigade from the time its position at the Stone Bridge 
was reached, did excellent work, both north and south of 
the Warrenton Pike, through the service of skirmishers and 
artillery. 

The line taken up by Stonewall Jackson upon which Bee, 
Bartow and Evans rallied on the southern part of the plateau, 



i6 

was a very strong one. The ground was high and afforded 
the cover of acurviHnear wood, with the concave side toward 
the Federal hne of attack. According to Beauregard's official 
report, made at the time, he had upon this part of the field, 
at the beginning, 6,500 infantry, 13 pieces of artillery, and 2 
companies of cavalry ; and this line was continually reinforced 
from Beauregard's reserves, and by the arrival of Johnston's 
troops from the Shenandoah Valley. 

To carry this formidable position McDowell had at hand 
the brigades of Franklin, Willcox, Sherman, and Porter; 
Palmer's battalion of regular cavalry; and Ricketts' and 
Griffin's regular batteries. Porter's brigade had been shaken 
by the morning's fight. Howard's brigade was in reserve 
and only came into action late in the afternoon. The men, 
unused to field service, and not yet over the hot and dusty 
march from the Potomac, had been under march since mid- 
night. The plateau, however, was assaulted promptly, the 
northern part of it carried, "the batteries of Ricketts and 
Griffin were planted near the Henry house, and McDowell 
clambered to the top of that structure to get a glance at the 
whole field. Upon the Henry house plateau, of which the 
Confederates held the southern and the Federals the northern 
part, the tide of battle ebbed and flowed as McDowell pushed 
in Franklin's, Willcox's, Sherman's, Porter's, and at last 
Howard's brigades; and as Beauregard put into action reserves 
which Johnston sent from the right, and reinforcements which 
he hurried from the Shenandoah Valley, as they arrived by 
trains. Beauregard has said that, on the plateau the disad- 
vantage of his "smooth-bore guns was reduced by the shortness 
of range." The short range was due to the Federal advance, 
and the several struggles for the plateau were at close quarters 
and gallant on both sides. The batteries of Ricketts and 
Griffin, by their fine discipline, wonderful daring, and match- 
less skill, were the prime features of the fight. The battle 



17 

was not lost till they were lost. When in their advanced and 
perilous position and just after their infantry supports had 
been driven off the slopes, a fatal mistake occurred. A regi- 
ment of infantry came out of the wood on Griffin's right, and 
as he was in the act of opening upon it with canister, he was 
deterred by the assurance of the chief of artillery that it "was 
a regiment sent by Heintzelman to support the battery." 
A moment more and the doubtful regiment proved its identity 
by a deadly volley, and "every cannoneer was cut down, and 
a large number of horses killed, leaving the battery — which 
was without support save in name — perfectly helpless." 
The effect upon Ricketts was equally fatal. He, desperately 
wounded, and Ramsey, his lieutenant, killed, lay in the wreck 
of the battery ! Beauregard speaks of his last advance on the 
plateau as ''leaving in our (Confederate) final possession the 
Robinson and Henry houses, with most of Ricketts' and Griffin's 
batteries, the men of which were mostly shot down where 
they bravely stood by their guns." The New York Fire 
Zouaves, who had been supporting Griffin's battery, fled to 
the rear in utter confusion. As said by Sherman: "Here, 
about 3.30 P. M., began the scene of confusion and disorder 
that characterized the remainder of the day." ■ 

About this time McDowell's adjutant-general rode to Burn- 
side's brigade and stated to Burnside the condition of affairs, 
with the suggestion that he form and move his brigade to the 
front. Returning he met Barnard, McDowell's chief engineer, 
and as the battle seemed to both of them to be going against 
the Federals, a note was sent to Miles — at the time near 
Centreville — "to move two of his brigades up to the Stone 
Bridge, and telegraph to Washington to forward all the troops 
that could be spared." 

After the arrival of Howard's brigade, McDowell for the last 
time pressed up the slope to the plateau, forced back the 
Confederate line and regained possession of the Henry and 



i8 

Robinson houses, also the lost batteries. But there were no 
longer cannoneers to man, or horses to move, these guns 
that had done so much. By the arrival upon this part of 
the field, 3.30 P. M., of his own reserves and Kirby Smith's 
brigade of Johnston's army, Beauregard extended his left to 
outflank McDowell's shattered, shortened, and disconnected 
line; and the Federals left the field about 4. 30. Until then 
they had fought wonderfully well for raw troops. There were 
no fresh forces on the field to encourage or support them, and 
the men seemed seized simultaneously by the conviction that 
it was no use to do anything more and they might as well 
start home. Cohesion was lost, the organizations, with some 
exceptions being disintegrated, and the men walked off. There 
was no special excitement except that resultng from the frantic 
efforts of officers to stop men, who paid little or no attention 
to what was said. On the high ground by the Matthews' 
house, about where Evans had taken position in the morning 
to check Burnside, McDowell and his staff aided by other 
officers, made a desperate but futile effort to arrest the masses, 
and form them into line. Arnold's battery as it came by was 
advised to unlimber and make a stand as a rallying-point. That 
was done, Arnold saying that he was in fair condition and 
ready to fight as long as there was any fighting to be done. - 
But all efforts failed. The stragglers moved passed the guns, 
in spite of all that could be done, and Arnold joined vSykes' 
battalion of infantry of Porter's brigade and Palmer's battalion 
of cavalry — all of the regular army — to cover the rear, as 
the men trooped past in great disorder across Bull Run. There 
were some hours of daylight for the Confederates to gather 
the fruits of victory; but a few rounds of shell and canister 
checked all the pursuit that was attempted, and the occasion 
called for no sacrifices or valorous deeds by the stanch regulars 
of the rear-guard. There was no panic in the ordinary mean- 
ing of the word until the retiring soldiers, guns, wagons, con- 



J9 

gressmen and carriages, were fired upon on the road east of 
Bull Run. Then the panic began, and the bridge over Cub 
Run, being rendered impassable for vehicles by a wagon that 
was upset upon it, utter confusion set in, pleasure carriages, 
gun carriages and ammunition wagons, which could not be 
put across the Run, were abandoned and blocked the way; 
and stragglers broke and threw aside their muskets, cut har- 
ness from their horses and upon them rode. 

In leaving the field the men took the same routes in a general 
way by which they had reached it. Hence when the men 
of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions got back to Centre- 
ville, they had walked about 25 miles. That night they con- 
tinued to the Potomac an additional 20 miles; so that these 
undisciplined and unseasoned men, within 36 hours walked 
45 miles besides fighting from 10 A. M. to 4 P. M. on a hot dusty 
July day. 

McDowell in person reached Centreville before sunset, and 
found there Miles' division with Richardson's brigade; three 
regiments of Runyon's division; and Hunt's, Tidball's, Ayres' 
and Greene's batteries. Subsequently there might have been 
added to those organizations Schenck's fine brigade ; Palmer's 
battalion of United States cavalry, Sykes' battalion of United 
States Infantry; Reynold's battalion of United States Marines; 
also some parts from other organizations, thus making in all 
a very formidable force; but there was lack of food and the 
mass of the army was completely demoralized ! Beauregard 
had about an equal force that had not been in the battle — of 
the right flank of McDowell's army with the left flank of Beaure- 
gard's army — ^consisting of the brigades of Kwell, Jones, 
and Longstreet, and some troops of other brigades. McDowell 
consulted the division and brigade commanders, who were at 
hand, as to making a stand or a retreat. The verdict favored 
retreat, but a decision of ofiicers, one way or the other, was 
not of moment; the men had already decided for themselves, 



20 

and were streaming away to the rear, in spite of all that could 
be done. They had no intention or treasure in Centreville, 
and their hearts were not there. Their tents, provisions, 
baggage, and letters from home were upon the banks of the 
Potomac, and no power could have stopped them, short of 
the Camp they had left a week before. Most of them were 
"sovereigns in uniform," not soldiers! McDowell accepted the 
situation, detailed the brigades of Richardson and Blenker to 
cover the retreat ; and the right flank of the army, a disorganized 
mass with some creditable exceptions, drifted, as the men 
pleased, away from the scene of action. 

The Fifth Division. 

The 5th division, of which I was the adjutant-general, con- 
stituted the left flank of McDowell's army, and was distributed 
to Centreville and positions covering Union Mills, Mclycan's 
ford, Blackburn's ford, and Mitchell's ford. Blenker's and 
Davies' brigades were ready to march at 2 A. M., but were 
delayed by other troops blocking the road until soon after 
daylight when it was found that Davies' could pass through 
the fields. After the brigade moved, I accompanied Miles, 
the division commander, to Centreville. Lieutenant Prime, of 
the United States Engineer Corps, attached to the staff, was 
with us, and his pioneers were directed to construct a redoubt, 
for 2 guns, so as to resist any attempt to outflank the position 
from the left by movement of the enemy over the Union Mills 
road. Other positions were examined, and chosen for intrench- 
ments on the road to Blackburn's ford. Blenker was then 
assigned to Centreville and began intrenching — one regiment 
being located at the former work of the enemy; one to the 
east of the enemy on the Warren ton Pike; and two on the 
heights towards Bull Run. With these last regiments were 
placed Tidball's and Greene's batteries. Greene, subsequently, 



21 

was removed by an order conveyed by me to him, to Richard 
son's position in front of Blackburn's ford, as a result of 
notification, from Richardson that 2,000 of the enemy were 
about to attack and that he required more artillery. The 
center of the Confederate line embraced Blackburn's and 
Mitchell's ford, and a hill in rear of the latter — not remote 
from the former — was the position from which Generals 
Johnston and Beuaregard waited the opening of an attack 
by the troops of their right flank, and from which Beauregard 
expected a decisive victory by noon, with the result to cut 
the Union army from retreat to Washington. So soon as the 
arrangements with Blenker were completed by the division 
commander, I accompanied him to Richardson's position. 
His troops were properly placed and effectively at work — 
Hunt's and Edward's batteries in good locations. There was 
not evidence immediately about the ford of the enemy, until 
the first opening of the battery fire, when he fled from barns 
and buildings in the vicinity. The division commander then 
returned to Blenker's location at Centreville and found all 
quiet and the troops discharging their duties. After some 
time he returned to Richardson's command and learned that 
the battery ammunition was rapidly diminishing. Skirmishers 
were ordered forward to examine, as it was decided that if 
a crossing of Bull Run could be made it would be done in order 
to cut the line of travel used by the retreating and advancing 
detachments of the enemy. The skirmishers had barely entered 
the woods when a heavy force of the enemy was discovered 
behind breastworks. The skirmishers reported the enemy 
greatly damaged by Greene's battery. Further action at the 
ford was not had, as McDowell's orders were on "no account 
to bring on a general engagement." It was about this time 
that I rode to an exposed point, to observe the enemy and 
gain information for the division commander. In doing so 
I drew the fire of the enemy — his bullets passed near my 



22 

head, around my horse, and fell close to the division commander 
and some members of his staff. In consequence the commander 
said: "Gentlemen, take cover!" Earlier in the day Davies' 
brigade, after marching through the fields, struck the road to 
Blackburn's ford about one mile from Centreville, and Davies 
was then instructed by Miles to assume command of Richard- 
son's brigade and take position in front of the enemy's batteries 
at the ford, on or near the battle-ground of the i8th; and to 
make a demonstration of attack in pursuance of McDowell's 
order. He immediately ordered forward the two 20-pounders 
of Hunt's battery, commanded by Edwards into an open 
field about 80 yards east of the Centreville road to Bull Run, 
and 1,500 yards from the enemy's batteries. Edwards at 
once commenced firing, his guns duly supported by Davies' 
infantry. This juncture was about 10 A. M. and about 11 
A. M. I reached the ground in company with Miles after he 
had made some change of Davies' infantry, in order to better 
support the artillery and secure a more rapid movement if 
necessarv. The artillery also was changed — 4 guns were placed 
in the open field where Edwards had been firing. An infantry 
regiment remained in reserve on the Centreville road about 
f of a mile in rear of the field. With the increased number 
of guns the artillery fire was continued. Prime, the engineer 
ofiicer, has said: * * * "Richardson proceeded to make 
an abatis to cover a road for infantry and cavalry which should 
connect the right [Richardson] with the left [Davies]. This 
road was formed on the skirt of the wood by cutting the trees 
necessary for the abatis. Considerable progress was made in 
the construction of a battery across the road with three em- 
brasures. This had a log revetment for the interior slope, 
and 10 or 12 feet of earth in front. Hunt's battery having 
been ordered to the left [in the open field], Greene's battery 
was ordered to replace it — two pieces on the right of the road, 
and two pieces on the left. An excellent view of the [enemy's] 



23 

artillery, cavalry and infantry as they moved either towards 
or from the main battle-field, the road in many places passing 
over cleared ground." 

Davies, during the afternoon, had evidence that a large body 
of cavalry and infantry had attempted to take him in rear 
by a road which had been blocked by his pioneers felling 
trees. The enemv was retiring. Hunt with his howitzers, 
and Green and Edwards with their rifled guns, poured a heavy 
fire into the retreating cohmm at a distance of | of a mile. 

About 4 P. M. Miles gave peremptory orders to Davies to 
hold his position, and remain there all night. Soon thereafter 
I accompanied Miles en route to Blenker at Centreville. Not 
far from that place we received word that McDowell's right 
flank of the army had been routed, and at the same time 
an order from McDowell to send two brigades up the Warrenton 
Pike to the bridge, and to telegraph to Washington for addi- 
tional troops. By Miles' order I at once rode with the order 
to Davies for its execution. He informed me that he could 
not spare his troops, and that he needed an additional regi- 
ment from the reserves as the enemy, 3,000 strong, was 
attempting to turn his left flank. Having satisfied myself 
bv riding to an exposed and dangerous position, that such 
an attempt was progressing, I suspended the order on my 
own responsibility, and at once returned to Miles to report my 
action, which he approved. I realized the momentousness of 
the responsibility in suspending the order for it involved : 
(i) the safety of the routed right flank of the army, and (2) 
the safety of the left flank, as held by the 5th division troops. 
Had the latter failed to repulse the Confederate attack, the 
fear of McDowell that if the left flank was turned or forced, 
"the whole stream of our retreating mass would be captured 
or destroved," might have proved a reality. The attack on 
Davies was made by a force variously estimated at 2,500 to 
3,000. McDowell has said: * * * "I had felt anxious 



2-4 

about this road from Manassas by Blackburn's ford to Centre- 
ville, along this ridge, fearing that whilst we should be in 
force to the front, endeavoring to turn the enemy's position, 
we ourselves should be turned by him by this road. For if 
he should once obtain possession of this ridge which overlooks 
all the country to the west to the foot of the spurs of the 
Blue Ridge, we should have been irretrievably cut off and 
destroyed. I had therefore directed this point to be held 
in force, and sent an engineer officer [Prime] to extemporize 
some field work to strengthen the position." 

* * * "By referring to the general order [for battle], 
it will be seen that while the operations were to go on in front, 
an attack was to be made at Blackburn's ford by the brigade 
[Richardson's] stationed there. A reference to his report and 
that of Major Hunt, commanding the artillery will show that 
this part of the plan was well and effectively carried out. 
It succeeded in deceiving the enemy for a considerable time, 
and in keeping in check a part of his force. * * * At the 
time of our retreat [right wing of the army], seeing great 
activity in this direction, much firing and columns of dust, 
I became anxious for this place, fearing if it were turned or 
forced the whole stream of our retreating mass would be cap- 
tured or destroyed." * * * Davies was engaged on the 
left flanks of Miles' division — which included for the time 
Richardson's brigade — and supported Hunt's artillery. Hunt 
has said: "At length they [the supporting infantry], were 
moved to the right and left, and ordered to lie down and await 
the approach of the enemy, who by this time were closing up 
in apparently overwhelming numbers. I now directed the 
gunners to prepare shrapnel and canister shot, and in case the 
enemy persisted in his advance not to lose time in sponging 
pieces — for minutes were of more value than arms — but to 
aim low and pour in'a rapid fire wherever the men were thickest 
or were seen advancing. 



25 

The enemy having by this time completed his preparations 
and driven in our skirmishers, now rushed forward and opened 
a heavy musketry fire on the battery, but from shortness of 
range, or from aiming upwards as they ascended the ravine, 
their shot mostly passed over us. The command was then 
given the battery to commence firing. Under the directions 
of Lieutenants Piatt and Thompson, second artillery, and 
Edwards, third artillery, commanding sections, the most 
rapid, well sustained and destructive fire I have ever witnessed 
was now opened. The men took full advantage of the per- 
mission to omit sponging. Yet no accident occurred from 
it. The guns were all of large caliber (two 20-pounder Parrott 
rifle guns, and four light 12-pounders), and they, swept the 
field with a perfect storm of canister. No troops could stand 
it, and the enemy broke and fled in every direction, taking 
refuge in the woods and ravines ; and in less than fifteen minutes 
not a living man could be seen on the ground which so recently 
had swarmed with them. The infantry regiments had not 
found it necessary to fire a single shot." 

After I had informed Miles that a brigade could not be 
furnished by Davies, we joined Blenker and nuoved his brigade 
up the Warrenton Pike, and placed it there to prevent the 
advance of the enemy, and protect the retreat of the right 
wing of the army — the great mass moving rapidly in wild 
confusion, but few in connected bodies. After Blenker's 
brigade had been well placed, I returned with Miles to Centre- 
ville; and then the brigades of Davies and Richardson were 
ordered to fall back from their fronts on Bull Run to the 
Centreville heights whereat with their artillery they were 
placed in position. They constituted a formidable force as 
already stated — all in complete readiness for effective defense, 
and not in the least affected by the routed right wing panic, 
which was so terrific that whilst I was under orders from 
McDowell, removing an ammunition train from a dangerous 



26 

position to a place of safety I had to direct the drivers to 
gather their horses, close up the wagons and then drive, under 
whip, through the disordered mass, which as it crowded the 
road across which the train had to pass, could not be stopped 
either by force or entreaty. The retreat continued until 
9 P. M. 

After Napoleon's soldiers had been overwhelmed by the 
Austrian troops, he addressed them saying: "I am displeased 
with you. You have not evinced discipline or valor. You 
have allowed yourselves to be driven from positions where a 
handful of resolute men might have arrested an army. You 
are no longer French soldiers. Chief-of-Staff, cause it to be 
written on their standards. They are no longer of the Army 
of Italy." In tears the battered veterans replied : * * * "Try 
us once more. Place us in the front rank of danger, and see 
if we do not belong to the Army of Italy. In the next battle 
they were placed in the van and made good their pledge b) 
rolling back the great Austrian Army." It is safe to say that 
the uninstructed, routed, and panicstricken "citizens in 
uniform" of McDowell's army, did not say "try us once more ! " 
Instead, they quietly with patriotic and heroic determination, 
enlisted under future calls, by Father Abraham, for troops; 
by act became true soldiers, purified by fire and blood, many 
so serving to the end of the war. Then they could well ask: 
Did I not belong to McDowell's army, and thereafter to the 
Grand Army of the Union? 

With truth it has been said that "Christianity can easily 
be shaken out of souls which have not been made firm by 
pain, and tempered like fine steel in the furnace of renuncia- 
tion." It is equally true that in the inferno of battle, the 
soul of a man, not tempered by education as a soldier and 
thus made firm, falls prey to fear at the critical moment when 
courage and valor are of supreme importance. 

Early the morning of July 27, there was distress in Wash- 



27 

ington. The citizens were alarmed and excited, and to add 
to the terror of the day, the retreating mass began to arrive. 
They appeared as disorderly mobs — in squads, companies, 
and as stragglers. Even the War Department was alarmed, 
as evidenced by the following telegrams: 

"War Department, July 22. 
"McDowell is sending his retreating army to the Potomac. 
Allow me to suggest that you man the forts and prevent soldiers 
from passing over to the city ; their arrival here would produce 
a panic and cause more trouble." 

■'Thomas A. Scott, 
''Assistant Secretary of War." 

Sherman, in the absence of General Mansfield to whom the 
foregoing was addressed, replied : 

"Fort Corcoran, July 22. 
' ' A djutant General : 

"I have this moment ridden in [with] I hope the rear men 
of my brigade, which in common with our whole army, has 
sustained a terrible defeat, and has degenerated into an armed 
mob. 

"I know not if I command but at this moment I will act as 
such, and shall consider as addressed to me the dispatch of 
the Secretary of this date. 

"I propose to strengthen Fort Corcoran, Fort Bennett, the 
redoubt on Arlington road, and the block-houses; and to aid 
me in stopping the flight, I ask you to order the ferry to 
transport no one across without my orders or those of some 
superior. 

"W. T. Sherman, 

''Colonel, Commanding." 

Relative to the battle we find the following expressions: 

"It was the best planned and worst fought of any during 

the Civil War. A fine organization of excellent material and 

plenty of courage; but no cohesion, little discipline and no 

respect for authority, all of which are the very foundation of 



28 

successful war. Both armies were fairly defeated, without 
knowing it. Whichever had stood the other would have run." 
[General W. T. Sherman.] 

"If the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their 
strategy we should have been beaten. If, instead of being 
brought into action in detail their troops had been formed 
into two lines, with a proper reserve and had assailed Bee 
and Jackson in that order, the two Southern brigades must 
have been swept from the field in a few minutes, or enveloped." 
[General Joseph K- Johnston, C. S. A.] 

President Davis "seems to have forgotten what was as 
well known then as now, that our army was more disorganized 
by victory than that of the United States by defeat . ' ' [General 
Johnston.] 

"The victory was as complete as one gained in an open 
country, by infantry and artillery can be. Our cavalry 
pursued as far as they could effectively; but when they 
encountered the main column [on the Warrenton Pike], after 
dispersing and capturing little parties and stragglers they 
could make no impression." [General Johnston.] 

"At 4.40, when the retreat of the enemy toward Centreville 
began, I sent orders to Brigadier-General Bonham * * * 
to march with his own and Longstreet's brigade * * * 
by the quickest route to the turnpike to intercept the retreat 
of the Federal troops. But he found so little appearance of 
rout in those troops [Miles' Fifth Division], as to make the 
execution of his instructions seem impracticable." [General 
Johnston.] 

"After the rout, having been ordered by General Johnston 
in the direction of Centreville in pursuit, these brigades ad- 
vanced nearly to that place, when night and darkness interven- 
ing, General Bonham thought it proper to direct his own 
brigade and that of General Longstreet back to Bull Run." 
[General Beauregard] 



29 

Reasons why the Confederates did not advance on Wash- 
ington : 

By General Johnston : "The apparent firmness of the United 
States troops at Centreville, who had not been engaged, which 
checked our pursuit ; the strong forces occupying the works 
at Georgetown, Arhngton and Alexandria ; the certainty, too, 
that General Patterson, if needed, would reach Washington 
with his army of 30,000 men sooner than we could, and the 
condition and inadequate means of the army in ammunition, 
provisions and transportation, prevented any serious thought 
of advancing against the Capital. It is certain that the 
fresh troops within the works were in number quite sufficient 
for their defense. If not. General Patterson's army would 
certainly reinforce them soon enough." 

By General Beauregard: * * * "In conclusion it is 
proper that my countrymen should be made acquainted with 
some of the sulBcient causes that prevented the advance of 
our forces and prolonged vigorous pursuit of the enemy to 
and bevond the Potomac. The War Department has been 
fullv advised long since of all of those causes, some of which 
onlv are proper to be here communicated. An army which 
had fought as ours on that day, against uncommon odds, under 
a July sun, most of the time without water and without food 
except a hastilv snatched scanty meal at dawn, was not in 
condition for the toil of an eager effective pursuit of an enemy 
immediately after the battle." * * * 

"As it was * * * that is the concentration of the 
Shenandaoh forces with mine (wrung later than the eleventh 
hour through the alarm over the march upon Richmond, and 
discountenanced again nervously at the twelfth hour, by 
another alarm as to how the 'enemy may vary his plans' 
in consequence), followed by the defeat of the main Federal 
forces — nevertheless the army remained rooted in the spot, 
although we had more than 15,000 troops who had been not 



30 

at all or but little in the battle and were perfectly organized, 
while the remaining commands in the high spirit of victory 
could have been reorganized at the tap of the drum, and 
many with improved captured arms and equipments." * * * 

By President Jefferson Davis: * * * "It could not be 
expected that any success obtainable on the battle-field would 
enable our forces to carry the fortifications on the Potomac, 
garrisoned and within supporting distance of fresh troops; 
nor, after the actual battle and victory, did the generals on the 
field propose an advance on the Capital, nor does it appear 
that they have since believed themselves in a condition to 
attempt such a movement." * * * 

By General Imboden: * * * "The uninformed, North 
and South, have wondered why Johnston and Beauregard did 
notfollowon to Washington. General Johnston, in his "Narra- 
tive," has clearly answered that question. It was simply 
impossible. We had neither the food nor transportation at 
Manassas necessary to a forward movement. This subject 
was the cause of sharp controversy between our commanding 
generals at Manassas on the one hand, and Mr. Davis and his 
Secretary of War, Mr. Benjamin, on the other. There was 
a disposition in the quartermaster's and commissary depart- 
ments at Richmond to deny the extent of the destitution of 
our army immediately after the battle. To ascertain the 
exact facts of the case. General Johnston organized a board 
of officers to investigate and report the condition of the trans- 
portation and the commissariat on the 21st of July, and their 
daily condition for two weeks thereafter. That board was 
composed of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert B. Lee (cousin of 
General R. E Lee), representing the commissary department. 
Major (afterward Major-General), W. L- Cabell, representing 
the quartermaster's department, and myself from the line. 
My associates on this board were old United States army 
officers of acknowledged ability and large experience. We 



31 

organized in August, and made an exhaustive investigation 
and detailed report. I have a distinct recollection that we 
found that on the morning of the battle there was not at 
Manassas one full day's ration for the combined armies of 
Johnston and Beauregard, and that on no single day for the 
succeeding two weeks was there as much as three days' supply 
there. We found that there were not wagons and teams 
enough at any time to have transported three days' supplies 
for the troops if they had been put in motion away from the 
railroad. We found that for weeks preceding the 21st of 
July General Beauregard had been urgent and almost impor- 
tunate in his demand on the quartermaster and commissary 
generals at Richmond for adequate supplies. We found that 
Colonel Northrop, the commissary general, had not only failed 
to send forward adequate supplies for such an emergency as 
arose when General Johnston brought his army from the 
valley, but that he had interfered with and interdicted the 
efforts of ofhcers of the department who were with General 
Beauregard to collect supplies from the rich and abundant 
region lying between the hostile armies. After reporting the 
facts, we unanimously concurred in the opinion that they 
proved the impossibility of a successful and rapid pursuit of 
the defeated enemy to Washington. This report, elaborately 
written out and signed, was forwarded to Richmond, and in 
a few days returned by Mr. Judah P. Benjamin, Secretary of 
War, with an indorsement to the effect that the Board had 
transcended its powers by expressing an opinion as to what the 
facts did or did not show, and sharply ordered us to strike out 
all that part of the report, and send only the facts ascertained 
by us. We met and complied with this order, though indig- 
nant at the reprimand, and returned our amended report. This 
was the last I ever heard of it. It never saw daylight. Who 
suppressed it I do not know." 

After the Southern delegates of the Democratic National 



32 

Convention, at Charleston, S. C, April, i860, withdrew, 
formed another convention and adjourned to meet in 
Richmond June 11, i860; the movement alarmed Alex- 
ander Hamilton Stevens, of Georgia, who said: "The leaders 
intended from the beginning to rule or ruin. * * * 
Envy, hate, jealousy, spite — these made war in Heaven, 
which made devils of angels, and the same passions will 
make devils of men. The secession movement was instigated 
by nothing but bad passions. Patriotism, in my opinion 
had no more to do with it than the love of God had with 
the other revolt." And after the adjournment of the Rich- 
mond convention, he added : ' ' Men will be cutting one another's 
throats in a little while. In less than twelve months we shall 
be in a war, and that the bloodiest in history. Men seem to 
be utterly blinded to the future." His words were prophetic! 
With Bull Run the threshold of the great war was passed — 
the struggle was continued and marked by the fire of guns, 
the flash of the sabre, the thrust of the bayonet — coupled with 
blood and mourning. Three years afterwards the gloom and 
sadness of the early period became intensified, and July 7, 
1864, President Lincoln promulgated, as expressive of the 
sense of the Congress of the United States, a concurrent reso- 
lution of the Senate and House requesting that a day of 
humiliation and prayer be fixed, so that loyal and abiding 
citizens might convene at their usual places of worship to 
supplicate the Almighty. The supplications of the people, 
offered to the Supreme Commander of the world: That the 
Civil War might be suppressed and the supremacy of the 
Constitution and laws of the United States might be estab- 
lished throughout all the States ; that we might not be destroyed 
as a people, among the family of Nations; and that the effu- 
sion of blood might be stayed, and unity and fraternity restored 
throughout our borders, were answered. Within nine months 
the channel of peace was opened at Appomattox on April 9, 



33 

1865, by the illustrious chieftains Grant and Lee; and the 
example of their armies was soon followed by the other con- 
tending forces. "The raging war that had divided the country 
had lulled, and private grief was hushed by the grandeur of 
the result." 

The stupendous struggle from 1861 to 1865, involved from 
first to last Union and Confederate forces numbering 3,700,000, 
and witnessed the wealth of the country lavished like water. 
Further contributions were not longer to be made to distorted 
features, ghastly ruins, and "the hidden anguish in the harvest 
of horror breathing from the silent ground." The blood of 
the land was to course anew — to mark the activities of life; 
and as a reward the now inseparably united North and South 
are harvesting the unbounded blessing of peace, with unsur- 
passed prosperity and greatness. 



Appendix. 



References: "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War." 
Therein has been published "McDowell's Advance to Bull 
Run," by Major-General James B. Fry. From that paper 
the salient facts connected with the advance and the attack 
by the Federal right upon the Confederate left, have been 
used almost in the words of Fry, who was the adjutant general 
of McDowell's army. Accordingly he spoke from personal 
observation and the official reports. 

Records of the Union and Confederate armies. Series I, Vol. 
II, pages 314-15-16-17 ; followed by sub-reports. 

The maps A and B herewith, will prove valuable in connec- 
tion with plates III and V, War Atlas, Union and Confederate 
Armies, 1861-1865. 



34 




Map A. 

A, A, A, A, General Confederate line the morning of July 
21, 1861. 

B, B, B, B, General Confederate line to repel McDowell's 
flank attack, via vSudley and New Market road. 

The Union troops are indicated as they were located at the 
turning point of the battle on the Henry house plateau. 



BATTERY SS \\ ■- -V 





/<■"■.",* //.MrRICKETTS:;: 

--■■'7 ■>*■ ' ♦jfe.'"- last;.::: 






Map B. Supplementary to A. 

Loss of Federal Army: killed, 460; wounded, 1,124; cap- 
tured or missing, 1,312. Grand total, 2,896. 

Loss of Confederate Army: killed, 387; wounded, 1,582; 
captured or missing, 13. Grand total, 1,982. 

Federal Army crossed Bull Run with 895 officers; 17,676 
rank and file; 24 pieces of artillery. 

Confederate Army of Potomac, rank and file engaged, 
total, 9,713; Army of the Shenandoah, rank and file engaged, 
total, 8,340. Grand total, both armies, 18,053; with 17 field 
guns. 



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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



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